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A report on Courk’s Blog describes a custom, low-cost laser fault-injection platform used to bypass the RP2350 microcontroller’s Secure Boot protections in a Raspberry Pi security challenge. The researcher says a single laser-induced fault allowed recovery of challenge-protected secret data and that the findings were submitted to Raspberry Pi; the supplied material does not describe the company’s response or the attack’s broader applicability.
A security researcher writing on Courk’s Blog says a custom-built laser fault-injection platform bypassed Secure Boot on Raspberry Pi’s RP2350 microcontroller and recovered secret data in a challenge targeting the chip’s protections. The researcher says the findings were submitted to Raspberry Pi; the report describes a hardware attack, not a software flaw or evidence that the method works against every RP2350 device.
The target was a Pico 2 board fitted with an RP2350 and configured according to the RP2350 Hacking Challenge instructions. Those instructions placed secret data in an one-time-programmable (OTP) area, enabled Secure Boot and other security measures, disabled the debug interface, and installed signed firmware intended to restrict access to the secret.
According to the report, the researcher chose laser fault injection after considering hardware attacks. A precisely timed laser can cause temporary faults in silicon through photoelectric effects, potentially disrupting a security check. The researcher’s stated approach was to direct the beam at a selected part of the exposed chip, with the aim of causing a fault without activating the chip’s glitch detectors.
The report says the work included building a custom platform and describes the result as bypassing Secure Boot with a single laser-induced fault. The source material provided here does not include the full experimental results, the exact fault location or timing, or independent confirmation of the reported outcome. The author also warns that the setup uses a high-power infrared laser that can be hazardous.
What the RP2350 Attack Shows
The report matters because it describes a way to test a microcontroller’s hardware defenses beyond ordinary software testing. The RP2350’s boot protections are designed to resist tampering, and the challenge configuration enabled protections intended to make both debugging and fault-based attacks harder. A successful fault during a security decision could undermine those controls on a device that is physically accessible to an attacker.
The finding should not be read as proof that Secure Boot is broadly ineffective. The source describes a specific challenge setup and a specialized physical technique requiring access to the chip’s silicon. That distinction matters to product users: the report highlights a potential risk under hands-on attack conditions, rather than establishing a remote route into devices or a general compromise of Raspberry Pi products.
It also offers a practical research contribution: the author presents a custom-built laser platform and says manufacturing files are included in the original article. That could make this class of testing more accessible to hardware-security researchers, although building and safely operating such equipment still requires technical skill.
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How the Challenge Set Up the Test
Raspberry Pi introduced the RP2350 in August 2024 as a successor to the RP2040, with added features that include Secure Boot. A few days later, the RP2350 Hacking Challenge was launched during DEF CON 2024. Its objective was to recover a secret stored on a challenge-configured Pico 2, potentially by overcoming the chip’s boot protections.
The RP2350 Boot ROM uses hardware-assisted safeguards, including a Redundancy Co-Processor (RCP). The datasheet describes RCP functions such as checking that program steps occur in order, validating redundant values and stack canaries, and halting the processor after a software-detected panic. The chip also has configurable glitch detectors that can reset it in response to voltage or electromagnetic fault-injection attempts; the challenge instructions set those detectors to maximum sensitivity.
The researcher says those defenses influenced the choice of a laser attack. The author reasoned that targeting a location away from the glitch-detector circuits might avoid triggering them. The report also notes other lower-cost laser fault-injection efforts, including work repurposing laser-engraving hardware and NetSPI’s RayV-Lite. These are related research efforts, not evidence that the RP2350 challenge was solved by those projects.
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Limits of the Published Findings
The supplied source material gives a high-level account but does not establish how reliably the fault can be reproduced, what precise chip locations and timings are required, or whether the technique succeeds across different RP2350 units and configurations. The full report may contain further technical detail, but these points cannot be confirmed from the material provided for this article.
It is also unclear whether Raspberry Pi has independently verified the reported bypass, issued a security advisory, or changed firmware or hardware in response. The report’s claim concerns a challenge configured to store a secret and enable security controls; it does not establish that production devices with different settings are vulnerable in the same way. No information provided here shows that the method has been used outside the challenge.
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Disclosure and Further Testing
The researcher says the results were sent to Raspberry Pi, but the provided source does not state what follow-up the company took. A response, technical assessment, or advisory could clarify the scope of the finding and whether mitigations are recommended for users of RP2350-based products.
For researchers, the next step is independent reproduction under documented conditions, including the equipment, target configuration, and success rate. The original blog post is the source for its platform details and manufacturing files, but the high-power infrared laser warning should be taken seriously. Until further verification is available, the result is best described as a reported challenge bypass rather than a confirmed, general vulnerability in all RP2350 devices.
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Key Questions
What did the researcher report?
The author of Courk’s Blog says a custom laser fault-injection platform bypassed Secure Boot on an RP2350 in the Raspberry Pi hacking challenge and recovered its protected secret data.
What is laser fault injection?
It is a physical attack technique that directs a focused laser at exposed silicon. The light can cause temporary changes in transistor behavior; if timed to a security operation, a fault may disrupt the operation.
Does this show that every RP2350 device is vulnerable?
No. The report concerns a specific challenge configuration and does not establish that the method works across all RP2350 devices or settings. The supplied source also does not provide independent verification.
Has Raspberry Pi responded to the report?
The researcher says the findings were submitted to Raspberry Pi. The material provided for this article does not include a company response, advisory, or confirmed mitigation.
Is the platform safe to build?
The report warns that the platform uses a high-power infrared laser, which can be hazardous. The source does not provide enough information here to assess safety procedures; readers should not treat the project as safe to reproduce without appropriate expertise and safeguards.
Source: hn
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